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Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West African Experience

It was a clear hot day. The school meeting hall rippled with
the heat of over five hundred persons. I had been speaking to the
students, faculty, and others in one of my many town hall meetings I conducted throughout Sierra Leone. The purpose of the
meetings was to provide a vehicle for the people to talk about
the war, the crimes, their pain, and other issues related to our
work. As I finished answering a question, a shy, small arm was
raised in the middle of the hall. I walked back to the student. He
meekly stood up, head bowed, and mumbled, loud enough for
those around him to hear, “I killed people, I am sorry, I did not
mean it.” I went over to him, tears in my eyes, hugged him and
said, “Of course you didn’t mean it. I forgive you.” 1

F

Introduction

or the first time in history, those who bear the greatest
responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law that took place during the conflict in Sierra Leone have been
charged with the use of child soldiers.2 The use of children in
armed conflict is an age-old issue.3 Modern international norms,
however, have identified and outlawed their use and have
largely excused them for their actions. The Special Court for
Sierra Leone (the Court) is on the cutting edge of international
criminal law in holding accountable warlords, commanders,
and politicians who turned to children as young as six to carry
out orders that sometimes resulted in war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The cynical recruitment of children, forced
to fight under great duress for ill-gotten gains, is no longer ever
an excusable act.
Only in the past ten years has the international community
begun to grapple with the scourge of child soldiers.4 A 1996
report to the Secretary General laid out a comprehensive program to protect children during armed conflict.5 The report
dramatically declared:
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All sides of the conflict in Sierra Leone enlisted and used children in
hostilities.

liable for crimes committed on the battlefield, concluding with a
useful analogy to Omar Khadr,7 a child involved in the conflict
in Afghanistan who should be immediately released from detention because the military commission trying him lacks personal
jurisdiction. Khadr has a protected status under international
humanitarian law and is not liable for his alleged actions.

The Conflict

[M]ore and more of the world is being sucked into a desolate moral vacuum. This is a space devoid of the most basic
human values; a space in which children are slaughtered,
raped, and maimed; a space in which children are exploited
as soldiers; a space in which children are starved and
exposed to extreme brutality. Such unregulated terror and
violence speak of deliberate victimization. There are few
further depths to which humanity can sink.6

Sierra Leone sits along the West African coast, a small state
in a string of nations linked together by a colonial past, with a
history of poor governance, conflict, and disease. West Africa
generally, and Sierra Leone in particular, possess vast natural
resources, including diamonds, rutile, bauxite, and other minerals. These commodities, however, are Sierra Leone’s curse.
Corruption and diamonds were the catalysts that ignited a conflict that resulted in the murder, maiming, mutilation, and rape
of over a half-million people in West Africa.
Prostrate before Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi,
these struggling former colonies of France and Great Britain
were vulnerable to unrest, conflict, and coup d’états. In the
early 1990s, young ruthless leaders, fresh from Libyan training

This article highlights the Court’s groundbreaking efforts to
bring to justice those who destroyed a generation of children,
and discusses the decision not to prosecute child soldiers on both
legal and moral grounds. The article will outline the conflict’s
history, explaining the role children played in Sierra Leone’s
civil war in the 1990s and the current state of the law related
to children in conflicts. It then addresses why children are not

* David M. Crane was appointed the founding Prosecutor for the
Special Court for Sierra Leone by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Kofi Annan in April 2002. In July 2005 he stepped down
and is now distinguished professor of practice at Syracuse University
College of Law. Portions of this article are excerpted from various
speeches, lectures, and writings of the author.
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with no families, little to no education, and a society unable to
assist them in rebuilding their lives. Many were physically and
psychologically damaged. The lost generation of Sierra Leone
now sits by pock-marked roads with little hope but for someone
to return them to the only life they had ever known — fighting,
raping, pillaging, and murdering.11
Photo courtesy of Adrián E. Alvarez

The Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Special Court was an innovative step in the evolution of
international war crimes tribunals. Even with the establishment
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Special Court is a
model that can work in the future to combat impunity in troubled
areas of the world.
The Court is a hybrid tribunal, independent of the United
Nations (UN) and any state.12 Established through an agreement
between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone in January
2002, the Court is both international and national.13 The signing
of this treaty was the culmination of a year and a half of discussions following a UN Security Council resolution directing
the Secretary-General to enter negotiations to create the Court.
Sierra Leone’s national parliament implemented the treaty by
passing a law in March 2002.14
The Court’s mandate is to try those who “bear the greatest
responsibility” for serious violations of international humanitarian law, including the laws of war, crimes against humanity,
and certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law.15 Crimes against
humanity encompass widespread or systematic murder, rape,
enslavement, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence,
torture, and other inhumane acts, including unlawfully recruiting and using children. Cases can be brought against anyone
who committed crimes or was responsible for crimes committed
in Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.16 This very specific
mandate is key to the Court’s success.
Importantly, the Court sits in the country where the violations occurred. This is the right place for the Court to directly
deliver justice to the people who suffered during the civil war.
The courtroom is open to the public. An ambitious outreach and
public information program is in place to keep Sierra Leoneans
informed and engaged in the Court’s work, for the Court
belongs, first and foremost, to them.
The Court hopes to make a lasting contribution to promoting
accountability and the rule of law. Capacity-building and legacy
activities constitute an important part of its work. Courtroom
facilities will be turned over to the people of Sierra Leone at
the conclusion of the trials. In addition, the Court hired a high
percentage of Sierra Leonean professionals and reached out to
the local legal community to design initiatives to bolster legal
reform. These include facilitating scholarship opportunities and
training programs in international humanitarian law, as well as
establishing a partnership with the local law school. Trials may
end, but the Court’s legacy will remain.

Many children were dragged into the bush and forced to serve as
soldiers. Some were made to murder their parents.

facilities, descended upon West Africa to begin a decade-long
campaign to conquer the region politically, by force if necessary. Charles Taylor, who had escaped from prison in the United
States, slipped quietly into Liberia and began a long civil war.
Taylor looked west over the border with Sierra Leone to that
country’s alluvial diamond fields and partnered with Foday
Sankoh, another graduate of the Libyan training camps and corporal in the Sierra Leonean Army. Diamonds would help keep
Taylor’s revolution and bank account well financed.8
With backing and planning assistance from Gadaffi and
Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Campaoré, Taylor assisted
Sankoh in launching two strikes into eastern Sierra Leone in
March 1991.9 Sankoh was admonished by Taylor to vigorously
recruit civilians to the cause, by terror and force, if necessary.10
What followed was a death struggle between various warring
factions, each brutalizing civilians, particularly women and children. The civil war, under Taylor and Sankoh’s Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) leadership, evolved into a terror campaign
seeking to control the diamond fields and subscribe the entire
nation into a joint criminal enterprise. Pain, suffering, and agony
reached new dimensions. The atrocities committed almost defied
description. “Believe the unbelievable,” is what I told the chamber responsible for trying the Civil Defense Force (CDF) leadership in the opening statement that began their prosecution.
All sides of the conflict in Sierra Leone used children. A
favorite rebel tactic to induce children to join a force was to
move in and surround a village. Children were made to kill their
parents and then driven into the bush and forced to serve as
soldiers, often for many years. Thousands of children, ranging
from six to 18 years of age, under the influence of cocaine and
marijuana distributed by commanders, roamed battlefields and
destroyed their own country. Over time, the warring factions
became their homes and families. A vast majority of children
had no choice but to fight, murder, rape, and mutilate, or they
would be killed themselves.
When the conflict staggered to its bloody conclusion in 2002,
an entire nation lay in ruins. Child soldiers found themselves

The Indictments and the Charges
Criminal investigations began two weeks after the Prosecutor
arrived in Sierra Leone in August 2002. On March 3, 2003, the
Prosecutor signed eight indictments and a trial chamber judge
confirmed the indictments in London on March 7. On March
10, just seven months after the Prosecutor’s arrival, members
of the investigations team, along with the Sierra Leone Police,
12

Crane: Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West African Exper
launched “Operation Justice,” simultaneously arresting all
indictees in Sierra Leone at the time, including the Minister of
Interior, Samuel Hinga Norman. A total of 13 indictments have
been issued to date. The six indictees arrested in March 2003,
plus three more arrested over a period of several months, are
detained at the Court compound in Freetown. Two of the three
joint trials are completed with a third expected to be complete
in 2008, including the trial against former Liberian President
Charles Taylor.17
The Court has been encouraged by the public response to the
indictments and trials. Peace has held, and many have spoken
out to support the Court’s work. According to polls, over twothirds of the population believe the Court is necessary, with
another two-thirds believing it will deter future conflict.18

Sankoh in Liberia in February 1991, children were rounded up
to bulk up Sierra Leonean forces. The CDF, particularly the
Kamajors — a traditional ethnic warrior group — subsequently
initiated children into their ranks. Children served on all sides
throughout the ten-year conflict.
The charges in the indictments stem from crimes enumerated
in the Statute. The specific crime of the use of child soldiers
is found in Article 4, “other serious violations of international
humanitarian law.” This provision allows the Prosecutor to
indict a person for three international crimes — intentionally
attacking civilians (Article 4a); crimes against peacekeepers or
humanitarian assistance workers (Article 4b); and the recruitment and use of child soldiers (Article 4c). The Prosecutor used
all three in the various joint criminal indictments.

“The Trial Chamber sent a clear message to the world
that a person who recruits child soldiers into a conflict is
a war criminal, but the children recruited and forced
to commit unspeakable acts are not.”
On June 20, 2007, Trial Chamber II entered a finding of
guilty against the leadership of the AFRC on 11 of the 14 counts
against them. One count on which they were found guilty was
the unlawful recruitment of child soldiers under the age of 15
into an armed force. This marked the first time in history where
commanders and political leaders were held liable for this
recently defined crime against humanity.22 The Trial Chamber
sent a clear message to the world that a person who recruits
child soldiers into a conflict is a war criminal, but the children
recruited and forced to commit unspeakable acts are not. The
Appellate Chamber upheld these finding on February 22, 2008.

Each indictee has been jointly and severally charged, and,
thus far, largely convicted, for using child soldiers, among other
international crimes. The extent of their involvement was widespread and systematic. Each indictee had command responsibility of the combatants that he led, including child soldiers. The
various combatants had small boy units (SBUs). Some of these
SBUs had specific duties. For example, in the January 1999
burning of Freetown, children were part of squads ordered to
mutilate, burn, and pillage. Child soldiers were seen throughout
the three week occupation carrying burlap bags full of body
parts, trailing blood along the way. They were required to bring
the bags to their commanders. If they refused, they were usually
killed.
In their amended indictment, the RUF leadership is charged
with recruiting and using child soldiers, specifically conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 into armed forces
or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities.19
Similarly, the leadership of the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC) was charged and convicted for these crimes.20
The dreaded leadership of the CDF was charged and convicted
for the unlawful recruitment of child soldiers.21 Taylor is also
charged with recruiting and using child soldiers, as is fugitive
indictee Johnny Paul Koroma. The Prosecutor likewise charged
deceased indictees Foday Sankoh and Samuel Bockerie.
It is alleged that all indictees are individually criminally liable for using children in armed conflict, either under the aiding
and abetting theory in Article 6.1 of the Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (the Statute) or, alternatively, under the
command responsibility theory of Article 6.3 of the Statute.
Each indictee is charged with recruiting and using children
during all times relevant to the indictment. As Taylor directed

The Challenges
During the pre-trial phase, several indictees made jurisdictional challenges to the charges and to the Court itself. On June
26, 2003, Hinga Norman specifically challenged the charge
against him relating to the use of child soldiers as not being a
crime at the time of its alleged commission. Another indictee
intervened as well. This preliminary motion was referred to the
Appeals Chamber pursuant to Rule 72(E) of the Court’s Rules
of Procedure and Evidence after the Prosecutor’s July 7, 2003
response. Various amicus briefs were filed by the University of
Toronto, International Human Rights Clinic, while the Court,
also, invited UNICEF to submit an amicus brief.23 An oral
hearing occurred on November 6, 2003, with a follow on posthearing submission by the Prosecutor on November 24, 2003.
On May 31, 2004, the Appeals Chamber issued the decision
on the preliminary motion based on lack of jurisdiction (child
recruitment) dismissing the motion. The Appeals Chamber
held that child recruitment was criminalized under customary
international law at the time frames relevant to the indictment,
13
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thus protecting the legality and specificity principles Norman
questioned. This was another first in legal history: a high court
ruled that the recruitment of child soldiers was a crime under
international law.24

principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
echoes fundamental principles of human dignity found in the
Geneva Conventions.28 The world had a new standard for protecting non-combatants’ rights and status in wartime.
One of the tragedies of the ensuing Cold War was the conflicts ignited in developing country “flashpoints.” Children were
once again the victims. In the 1970s, the world paused long
enough to reconsider the Geneva Conventions of 1949, shaping
them through two new protocols to reflect the realities of modern armed conflict.29 Once again the bar had been identified and
raised. Most of the nations of the world, including many newly
independent states, agreed to the new standards.30
The Protocols specifically prohibit the use of children in
armed conflict. The criminality of the act of using children in
conflict, however, is not specifically laid out. The implication
is that violating the Geneva Conventions’ provisions related to
civilians as non-combatants implies a grave breach when using
children in combat.31 Such breaches impose a duty to investigate
and prosecute upon all signatories.32
The subsequent adoption of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) highlights the prohibition against the use
of children in armed conflict.33 It is my judgment that the CRC
criminalizes the concept of child recruitment. One can argue
that child recruitment as a crime is reflective of customary
international law.34 The CRC requires national jurisdictions to
establish a minimum age at which criminal responsibility may
be assigned.35 Article 1 of the CRC defines children as “all
human beings below the age of 18.” 36 Additionally, the CRC
Optional Protocol II admonishes armed groups that are distinct
from armed forces of a state not to recruit or use in hostilities,
under any circumstances, persons under 18.37 The applicable
international agreements also cover the detention of delinquents and the issues related to this stage of the juvenile justice
process.38
Despite states’ political and legal recognition that child
recruitment was a universal crime and that children had a special
status in conflict, child recruitment continued unabated. Millions
of children died in the 1980s and 1990s, mainly in Africa where
children played a significant role in armed conflicts. The 1996
Secretary-General’s report on this issue stunned the UN by highlighting the extent of the problem throughout the world. There
were calls for action and an evolving plan emerged to monitor
recruitment of child soldiers.
In the late 1990s, the international community began to
develop a mechanism to prosecute war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The Rome Statute created the ICC, which
is now the world’s attempt to stamp out impunity. The Rome
Statute specifically states that the recruitment of children under
the age of 15 is a “serious violation of international humanitarian law.” 39

The State of the Law
The Appeals Chamber’s decision correctly reflects the state
of the law.25 The use of children in warfare is not a new phenomenon. Children have followed armies for centuries as support
personnel — as pages, water carriers, and musicians, particularly drummers. In navies throughout Europe, nobility seconded
children to warships to learn a trade. Others were pressed into
seamanship.
With the advent of The Hague rules governing weapons
in war in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
rules of warfare took on a universal status. Coupled with the
Red Cross movement, the role of the combatant became a legal
term of art. The status of the non-combatant also began to take
shape.26 Yet specifics regarding combatants’ ages were not
well-defined early in the regulation process. The international
community focused more on regulating weapons that would
cause unnecessary suffering and the types of targets combatants
could engage.

“Legally, morally, and
politically the international
community . . . has
separated out children from
the horrors of combat, to
protect and nurture, to
rehabilitate and support,
not to punish.”
After World War I and into World War II, the shift away
from universal rules relating to weapons and targets began. By
the end of the two wars, the focus was rightfully on non-combatants. The founding of the UN in 1945 created a permanent
body that could be a voice for non-combatants, particularly for
children.
The universal rules began to narrow and define the special
status of non-combatants. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are
the cornerstone of these rules, which by their nature, protect
persons who are “out of the combat” — prisoners of war, the
shipwrecked, and civilians.27 It is here that children became
specially protected under international law. Around this time
the international community laid out international human rights

The Decision Not to Prosecute the Child Soldiers
of West Africa
The Statute of the Special Court gives the Prosecutor authority to indict children for crimes they committed between the
ages of 15 and 18. The basis for including this controversial
provision was to give the Prosecutor legal authority to prosecute
any child soldier he might consider as having borne the greatest
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during Sierra Leone’s civil war.
14
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The Prosecution decided early in developing a prosecutorial plan that no child between 15 and 18 had the sufficiently
blameworthy state of mind to commit war crimes in a conflict
setting. Aware of the clear legal standard highlighted in international humanitarian law, the intent in choosing not to prosecute
was to rehabilitate and reintegrate this lost generation back into
society. It would have been impractical to prosecute even particularly violent children because there were so many. Further, it
was imperative that the prosecution seriously consider the clear
intent of the UN Security Council and the drafters of the Statute
creating the Court to prosecute those and only those who bore
the greatest responsibility — those who aided and abetted; created and sustained the conflict; and planned, ordered, or directed
the atrocities. No child did this in Sierra Leone.
In November 2002, the Prosecution announced that child soldiers would not be prosecuted, as they were not legally liable for
acts committed during the conflict. There was universal praise
for this decision. It took prosecuting child soldiers themselves
for the tragedy they have experienced off the legal table, instead
placing children on the rehabilitation track, as is the appropriate
norm under international law.

to the Special Court’s Statute related to recruitment of children
under the age of 15. The ICC will, thus, be able to look to the
groundbreaking work of the Special Court in charging warlords,
politicians, and governments who continue to ignore the clear
prohibition for this criminal conduct.42 Only when the rule of
law is enforced will abusers of children be held accountable at
the international level, and only then will this crime begin to
diminish.
And the children truly are the victims in this scenario. Just as
we could not hold these Sierra Leonean children responsible for
the horrific violence they were forced to carry out, we also cannot hold similar children involved in other conflicts accountable
for their acts, no matter our level of interest in the region or that
our forces were the targets of the violence.
Omar Khadr, a young Canadian, could have been a child
in Sierra Leone. But he was in Afghanistan, in similar circumstances, not of his making or under his control, in an environment from which, as a child, there was no escape. Legally,
morally, and politically the international community, including
the United States, has separated out children from the horrors of
combat, to protect and nurture, to rehabilitate and support, not
to punish. No children found in combat should be held liable
for their acts. The jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone demonstrates that this is the legal standard of the world
community and of the United States.
I will close with another tragedy in this ten-year long tale of
horror:

Conclusion: The Future
Despite assertions that the recruitment of child soldiers is an
international crime, the tragedy continues worldwide. Between
1986 and 1996, over two million children were killed in armed
conflict.40 Countless more have been killed since, many in places
such as Sierra Leone. A February 2005 UN report specifically
singled out 42 armed groups in 11 countries. The UN SecretaryGeneral’s Special Envoy for Children in Armed Conflict, Olara
Otunu, stated that these armed groups should be punished for
war crimes or crimes against humanity for what they have done
to children.41
Certainly, there is an increasing awareness of the scourge of
child soldiers and a shift towards action. The UN must be at the
forefront of this effort, backed by a unified Security Council that
takes swift and decisive action when confronted with the issue.
International courts will have to aggressively charge this crime
in future indictments to help prevent the practice of using child
soldiers.
The Court’s Norman appellate decision and its subsequent
conviction of the leadership of the AFRC, as well as the conviction of Norman’s co-defendants in the CDF case, both in
2007, will certainly help advance the jurisprudence on child
recruitment. The ICC’s statute contains a provision identical

[A child] lived in a village in the Kono district. [His family
was] told that the rebels were going to attack . . . . [H]e fled
into the bush with his parents and brother, but [they] were
caught by the RUF. The rebels took his younger brother and
himself to Kaiama along with thirteen other boys. The rebels
lined the fifteen children up and offered them a choice: Join
one line if they wanted to be a rebel, another line if they
wanted to be freed and allowed to go home. All fifteen of
these boys . . . joined the line for freedom. It was the wrong
choice. They were accused of sabotage to the revolution. To
keep them from escaping each was held down, screaming,
and one-by-one had AFRC and/or RUF carved into their
chests with the blade of a sword. The [child] was now just
marked property. . . . . [H]is scarred chest . . . to this very
day bears the letters: A-F-R-C R-U-F. 43
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